oped -as in medieval and early modern Europe, when, as Wormald said about Scotland, 'the question of interaction between public and private [feud-based] justice is at its most problematic'. 17 Her analysis naturally highlighted 'the justice of the feud' 18 in relation to the traditional concept of 'the justice of the state'. But in human history feud justice is age-old, whereas state justice is relatively new. Accordingly, since the 'new' is commonly a bigger factor in change than the 'old', my reflections are angled towards the justice of the state.
I
In the first half, these reflections are on the wider context -beginning in modern Saudi Arabia. Its legal system applies Islamic shari'a law, whereby, with deliberate homicide, the victim's head of kin can either impose the death penalty on the perpetrator, or remit it and accept diyya (blood-money). 19 Thus the justice of the feud still operateswhich impinged on Western consciousness in 1997 after an Australian nurse, Yvonne Gilford, was murdered there. 20 Two British colleagues were accused, and confessed in prison; one was sentenced to death, the other to 500 lashes. Westerners' reactions were mixed. Some (favouring the death penalty) accepted Saudi justice; but many vehemently condemned the judgement because the confessions appeared forced. That point was technically irrelevant under the Saudi system, however -and the only way to prevent the execution was for Gilford's brother to accept diyya. He initially refused, 21 but was persuaded to agree, and $1.2 million (c.£750,000) blood-money was paid, allegedly by British defence contractors. The execution and the lashes were cancelled, and the defendants were released in 1998. The case highlights that fundamental instinct for revenge. Gilford's mother said 'murder the nurses if they murdered my daughter', 22 and her brother's wife wished 'the killers should go through what my sister-in-law went through'. 23 This attitude is unsurprising: the second quotation is from a newspaper article examining how, across the West, 'the appeal of retribution is increasing, not in the style of the vendetta … but along the more limited Biblical lines of an eye for an eye'. 24 Thus, in a sense, the state 17 Wormald, 'Bloodfeud', 57. 18 Ibid., 56ff. (used 27 times in all); a preferable formulation to Gluckman's 'peace in the feud'. . The Times Digital Archive also provides a useful account (search for 'Gilford' +'Parry'+'McLaughlan' between Dec. 1996 and June 1999). 21 Though opposing the death penalty, if the defendant were guilty he wanted her punished, preferably by a long prison sentence -which was not possible under shari'a law. 22 Pennell, 'Law as a cultural symbol', 135, citing Daily Mail, 23 Aug. 1997. 23 Jack O'Sullivan, 'Wanted: but dead or alive?', Independent, 4 June 1997: <http://www.independent.co.uk /news/1254029.html>, accessed 1 June 2013). 24 Ibid.: highlighting the USA's 'Federal Victims and Witness Protection Act ', 1982 , by which increasingly has replaced the kin-group as the agency of retributive punishment (often too lenient for victims' families). However, in Saudi Arabia the prosecutor is the victim's head of kin, not a state official. Also, though judges determine whether the accusation is valid, if it is, the accuser determines the accused's fate: diyya or death. That kindred role is typical of feud justice, but the state is not excluded: it is there in an enabling capacity, and has one executive function, for if diyya is refused, a public executioner carries out the death sentence. 25 So the state could be seen as employing and maintaining the justice of the feud, under shari'a law; there is no conflict between 'state' and 'feud' justice. Now, shari'a law derives from the Qur'an (seventh century) and Hadiths ('traditions'; ninth century), as interpreted by scholars over subsequent centuries, and the continuities are strong in Saudi Arabia. 26 Diyya originates in one passage in the Qur'an enjoining compassion instead of eye-for-eye retaliation, and another in the Hadiths indicating that a man's blood-money should be 100 camels. 27 That is still the Saudi
Arabian benchmark -and in 2011 diyya for deliberate homicide was raised from 110,000 ryals to 400,000 (c.£70,000) because of inflation in camel prices. 28 Saudi blood-money, therefore, represents more than a millennium of continuity -back to the era of Anglo-Saxon wergeld and Gaelic cró. 29 The standard view is that diyya was introduced to limit feuding: 'with the advent of Islam, this institution of revenge was drastically modified'. 30 That probably exaggerates, because the concept is pre-Islamic; 31 but shari'a law did institutionalise it, 32 producing a process that can be regarded as having been brought about by the earthly rulers (Muhammad and subsequent caliphs) of a theocratic state, who by incorporating 'peace in the feud' within Islam also harnessed the sense of the 'holy'. Thus we can see the justice of the state impacting on that of the feud during the early Middle Ages, in a way that operated throughout the Islamic world and still does in Saudi Arabia -which, in terms of Wormald's spectrum, is surely right in the middle. We now shift to Europe, initially the Balkans. Albania is on the spectrum's edge: the horrific feuding that still occurs there 'is not about order and stability [but] about --------------frequent 'victim impact statements', generally demanding a retaliatory death penalty, are presented to the court after an accused is found guilty (note that in the UK such statements do not influence sentencing). 25 Peters, Crime and Punishment, 30-2, 36-7; in the Gilford case this received great press attention. 26 Ibid., 6-68, 148-53. 27 Qur'an, 5.45; Hadith Sahi-al-Bukhai, 9.83.36. For early diyya, Lahcen Daaït, 'Le prix du sang (diya) au premier siècle de l'Islam', Hypothèses (2006/1), 329-42. 28 Arab News, 10 Feb. 2010 and 6 Sept. 2011: <http://www.arabnews.com/node/336788 and …/390060>, accessed 1 June 2013. That is for killing a Muslim male; for a female Muslim, or a Christian of either gender, it is only half. 29 With payments in livestock, the animals bred and thus provided lasting income. As a Saudi economist stressed, diyya in camels was a long-term investment for the deceased's dependants; but SR400,000 would be spent before a victim's children reached maturity: Arab News, 25 Sept. 36 'It is an obligation to take over the father's or kinsman's feuds (inimicitias) and friendships (amicitias).
But feuds do not go on with no reconciliation. In fact, even homicide can be atoned for with a fixed number of cattle or sheep. The whole family receives this compensation. This is an advantage for the community, since feuds are dangerous where freedom exists'. Tacitus, Germania, c. middle, regional duchies and counties achieved semi-independence, but often fragmented through accidents of inheritance; and at the lower, an expanding knightly class became increasingly prominent. 40 South and south-west Germany finished up as a 'geopolitically highly fragmented area, with … puny territorial states [and a] kaleidoscopic jumble of ill-defined, intermingled and competing jurisdictions'; 41 and it was not much better elsewhere. General law-codes existed, especially the Sachsenspiegel (from the thirteenth century), 42 but little direct overall authority. The emperors did get lords to make regional peace-agreements (Landfrieden), which generally broke down; and princely hostility thwarted Frederick III's empire-wide Landfried of 1465. 43 In practice, the intermingled jurisdictions made legal dispute-settling virtually impossible: 'each party to a dispute always claimed to have justice on its side, whereas no single supreme institution existed which bindingly defined the law'. 44 That puts Germany fairly close to Albania on Wormald's spectrum -and of course stimulated feuding. German feud research, however, has taken a Sonderweg. 45 Land was a legal idea … nearer to 'district' in one of its original senses as a juridical dimension in which, in the medieval milieu, all rights, authority, and law added up to a shared endeavour partly to do with administering the law courts, partly to do with the defence of the land, and partly allowing for selfdefence within the land.
52
It is the territory of Landfrieden, and not unlike the English county community. Brunner derived it from the Germanic past, when 'Civitas, tribe and Land were associations of arms-bearing men … able to fight for their rights'.
53 Such fighting could be done either in a court, or if (as was often the case) that was unsatisfactory, through force of arms -in other words feud, which 'was as integral to medieval political life as war is to the modern state'.
54
But Brunner's feud was purely 'knightly', and excluded bloodfeud:
The Middle Ages distinguished … between blood vengeance, that is, mortal enmity, and the knightly feud with its 'challenge'. The former could be employed by anyone … On the other hand the knightly feud was reserved to the nobility and seigneurial proprietors of similar status … The knightly feud could be employed to settle any conflict, so that even the most trivial legal dispute could serve as an excuse for declaring a feud.
55
This 'knightly feud' did not involve vengeance, and was legitimate if formally declared -as confirmed by Charles IV's 'Golden Bull' of 1356, which prohibited attacks 'under the pretext of a feud, with arson, robbery or plunder, unless the feud has been announced publicly … three days in advance'. 56 The legitimation, however, did not apply to killing, and while 'the killing of one's opponent' and 'honest homicide' are recorded 'often enough', Frederick III telling him, 'I want to be enemy of Your Grace's land and people, and wherever I encounter your servitors and subjects, I will cause them damage '. in knightly feuds the killing of one's opponents was something rather to be avoided. For one thing, it was not exempt from the vengeance of the victim's friends and relatives -that is, from blood vengeance and blood feud. And for another, even though it was legally recognised as long as 'enmity' existed between the parties, it nevertheless went against the purpose of the feud, which was to rectify an injustice, not to destroy the other party.
57
Killing in 'knightly feud' broke the rules, and the killer's peers would turn against him -making it counter-productive. But otherwise feuding had a very wide scope. 'Injustice' was any slight to knightly (and hence aristocratic) honour; and any member of the knightly class could declare feud against any other, even a territorial prince or the emperor.
58
The commonest quarrels, however, were among those in frequent contact, and the typical feud occurred within a Land. The aim was to make an opponent redress the 'injustice' by damaging his lordly and economic status through attacks on his dependent peasantry. Thus the peasants were 'most affected by feuds … the loss of harvest, cattle, clothing, and household furnishings was bad enough, while the burning down of whole villages caused losses that were irreparable' 59 -and peasants were often killed. Killing for revenge … was something quite different … The murderer was peaceless vis-à-vis the friends and relatives of his victim, and could therefore be killed out of hand unless an atonement intervened … Even among the nobility and others who had the right to feud, and whose feuds were mostly of the ordinary sort, the blood feud was not unknown.
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Thus it is not that late medieval German elites did not have bloodfeuds; it is that (because of Brunner's approach) these appear not to have received in-depth study. Yet the Sachsenspiegel lawcode that was followed for centuries treated wergeld, a major concomitant of bloodfeud, as current; 69 and actual wergeld payments by killers are recorded in seventeenth-century Holstein. 70 Surely, therefore, compensation for both 'honest homicide' in knightly feuds and killings in bloodfeud was required -which suggests German parallels with all types of Scottish feuding. As for the anthropological issue, 'peace in the feud' existed in early medieval Germany, upheld by central power; but when central power diminished, we might expect feuding to have intensified. However, if most significant quarrels occurred within coherent group structures (Brunner's Land, Zmora's neighbourhood), then, in the absence of effective external authority, group pressures to avoid or settle feuding would no doubt have increased, as would individual and collective fears of its disastrous effect. The collective group response would presumably have been to create a means of settling elite disputes honourably but with the least possible violence -as Brunner implicitly argued. 71 That is surely what the knightly feud was about: letting landowning neighbours quarrel dramatically and satisfactorily, without threatening 74 Ibid., 57-8. 75 Except that accounts of French private war show that there was no bar to killing; and see Justine 'local wars were just as common … as in the feud-friendly Empire ' . 79 Yet the ordinances did at least assert royal antipathy to private warfare. Also, both Richard Kaeuper and Justine Firnhaber-Baker show that while they did not prevent that from breaking out, once it happened individuals could be prosecuted for breaching them. 80 But the 'plurality of powers' also applied: noble claims to a right to private warfare had considerable effect, 81 and so such prosecutions succeeded only in areas under direct royal jurisdiction.
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However, from Philip IV's reign (1285-1314) other strategies were employed. First, 'interaction between royal and noble powers' was utilised: 'royal officials allowed and indeed themselves engaged in a range of extra-and quasi-judicial negotiations with warmakers', especially by acting as high-status honest brokers to persuade warring parties to compromise and make peace. 83 Second, a direct means of responding to feuding anywhere, irrespective of jurisdictions, was developed: that of bringing one of the parties into the king's special peace. 84 To attack someone within that peace was tantamount to attacking the king himself -always illegal no matter where the offender lived. This nullified the plurality of powers, since everyone in the kingdom was the king's subject. Providing 'safeguards' for threatened individuals, therefore, helped combat private warfare. It was not infallible: a safeguard might be obtained by the aggressor, or by both sides, or could be ignored -though that was risky. 85 Safeguards were simply based on the king's age-old right to protect his friends; 86 but through that traditional power, French crown authority extended into the world of the feud.
Third, that also happened via letters of remission granting royal pardons, which survive from 1304 on. Though these were criticised both then and now 'for allowing thieves and murderers to escape with impunity', 87 Claude Gauvard's magisterial analysis of 7,500 of the remissions that the royal chancery issued throughout the kingdom between 1364 and 1515 paints a very different picture. 88 They went to all social classes, Whatever the process adopted for restoring the peace, an accord was always necessary in order for the king to be able to legitimately grant his remission. The clause that limited royal grace, the only one that might be formulated, provided that 'satisfaction is to be made to the party if not [already] made'. It is present in 90% of the letters: it is therefore a clause that could not be got round. 93 The procedure for bestowing royal grace is also important. 94 A killer seeking remission had to obtain chancery authorisation, get his letter properly written, submit it for royal approval, pay a fee -and then present it to the relevant local court, where its accuracy would be investigated, ideally before his victim's kin, who could challenge it and demand damages. Only then, if all went well, would the letter be formally ratified. The court hearing was vital, but it judged not the killer himself but the narrative in his letter and, especially, the satisfaction of his victim's kin -to assure the king that his exercise of royal grace was deserved. This is the most significant way whereby the late medieval French crown came, by extra-judicial means, to exert state authority over the ('L'honneur blessé'). 90 Ibid., within chapters 17 ('La Vengeance'), 18(2) ('Meutres et homicides'), and 20 ('Pardonner et punir'); esp. 778-9, 797-9, 940-4. 91 Best summed up in Gauvard, 'Grâce et exécution capitale', 218: 'the royal chancery had every facility to grant the remission -a remission which stops vengeance and precipitates accord between the parties'. 92 Ibid., 277-80, and Gauvard, 'De grâce especial', 907-20 ('Justice et miséricord). 93 Gauvard, 'De grâce especial', 778: 'satisfaccion soit faicte a partie si faite n'est'. 94 feud-settlement process -though actual feuding still continued during the early modern era.
Thus, while France and Germany had common roots, the late medieval contrast is striking. Admittedly, that might be due partly to different approaches: if a German study included peasant quarrels and killings, or if a French one dealt only with the knightly classes, it might be less. 95 Nevertheless, the role of the crown was crucial: the French kings found ways of bypassing jurisdictional problems; the German emperors did not; nor, yet, did the princes (who did not possess 'royal grace'). As for Wormald's spectrum, France can be placed well within the English side -while the relevance of French procedures, especially letters of remission, for any commentary on her 'Bloodfeud' is patently obvious. We now cross to England, where, to quote Wormald, before the Norman Conquest public authority had already taken over at least part of the responsibilities of the kin, and where within two centuries after it the bloodfeud itself had been replaced by a concept of crime enshrined in a uniquely comprehensive system of royal justice.
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Her summing-up is still valid, though nuanced by recent work. In particular, Paul Hyams's Rancor and Reconciliation softens the distinction between earlier kin-based and later crown-based justice. 97 Hyams shows that once the latter became predominant (in the thirteenth century), state agency provided an effective and safe way of gaining revenge on an opponent -by getting him condemned either to death, or more commonly to outlawry for fleeing trial (so anyone could kill him). Many of Hyams's 'case narratives' illustrate how English royal justice became an instrument of feud: if you seek revenge and can manipulate the judicial system (or have it manipulated), that becomes a powerful weapon.
98
The more complex the system, the more it could be manipulated -as in fourteenth-and fifteenth-century England, where numerous conflicts among the landed classes led Kaminsky to apply his concept of 'noble feud' there as well as to France. 95 Since over 90% of Gauvard's letters related to non-nobles, the conclusions from these will obscure any noble-specific points. That said, Carroll's analysis in Blood and Violence, which focuses much more on nobles, does not contradict Gauvard's. 96 Wormald, 'Bloodfeud', 57. too little. The best solution was direct royal action -very direct, believed the author of a story about Henry V (1413-22) in the Brut chronicle. A Lancashire and a Yorkshire knight were feuding, and some of their followers were killed. Henry summoned them, and asked on what authority they had made his lieges kill each other. They begged for mercy, whereupon Henry said he had some oysters to eat, and unless they had made peace before he finished, they would be hanged! 106 They did, of course. The storypresumably written later, when feuding was rife -portrayed Henry as the great upholder of justice. Yet the letter of the law was not followed: despite the killings, he pardoned the offenders -but terrified them into not offending again. Edward Powell has illustrated the reality of such flexibility. Under Henry IV (1399-1413) the midlands had suffered from serious disorder and feuding; so in 1414 Henry V sent King's Bench judges there on 'superior eyre'. Some 2,200 persons were indicted for violence, and about 800 stood trial (the rest would have been outlawed). But few were found guilty; most either paid a fine in advance or bought a pardon, and Henry soon pardoned everyone who had been indicted. That looks like serious weakness in one of medieval England's toughest kings -yet, as Powell asks, what else could be done? Those indicted included most of the county elites; had they been imprisoned or executed, local government would have collapsed. 107 On the other hand, 'the most serious offenders were made to take out recognisances for large sums to keep the peace; for the rest a fine or pardon was sufficient to buy off the king's suit and gain readmission to his peace'. 108 Those readmitted to the king's peace would have known that reoffending would not be tolerated -surely the Brut's main message. Henry V's strong personal kingship evaporated under Henry VI (1422-61), and though Edward IV (1461-83) was tougher, his real heir in this respect was Henry VII (1485-1509). Had the oysters story been written about him, the knights would have been put under recognisance, promising in writing to pay a large sum of money if they offended again. All fifteenth-century kings used recognisances to a certain extent, but Henry VII made them 'the linchpin of his entire ruling system'; 109 hundreds were exacted from men engaging in violent disputes, generally after appearing before Henry himself or his council. That bypassed the formal, clogged-up, law-courts -but in practice was the best way of dealing with troublesome gentry and lords.
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Thus the response to feuding by the two most successful fifteenth-century English kings paralleled French rather than German practice. Also, the numerous pardons 106 The Brut, ed. F. W. D. Brie (EETS, 1906-8), ii, 595; Powell, Kingship, Law, and Society, 230-1. 107 Ibid., 166-94. 108 Ibid., 194. recorded in the patent rolls of fourteenth-and fifteenth-century England suggest that royal grace was exercised as frequently as in France;
111 while English letters of pardon had to be 'proved' in court, when 'any appellant wishing to bring a suit against the recipient of the pardon' was entitled to object. 112 However, as the word 'appellant'
indicates, a simple objection was not enough; it had to be made through a legal 'appeal of felony' -a formal private prosecution -which could win damages, but might be both costly and unsuccessful. 113 That was obviously much less satisfactory for injured parties than the French system, in which remissions were almost always conditional upon their satisfaction. The reason was, of course, the great development of twelfthand especially thirteenth-century English royal justice 114 -as a result of which, F. W. Taylor answers significantly, 'we cannot continue identifying crime by the presence of royal or … state punishment. Crime should instead be understood to denote offences that an authority put right, through the force of its own law-making'. 124 Saudi Arabia, where the state plays a largely enabling role, comes to mind. 125 But from the later twelfth century the Scottish crown claimed more. A charter of William I asserted that major offences -'murder, premeditated assault, rape, arson and plunder' -belonged 'to my regality' and should be prosecuted by his 'crowner' before his justices; while his laws forbade lords from holding courts without notifying the sheriffs, and reserved the 'four pleas … pertaining to his crown: namely rape, plunder, arson and murder '. 126 Furthermore, the thirteenth-century 'legislation of Alexander II reveals a royal monopoly over crime' -which has obvious implications for the granting of remissions.
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Such a monopoly was never absolute, however, because (as in France) the rights of the victim of crime or his kin remained fundamental. Consequently, Scottish remissions, like French (and as in shari'a law), were always conditional on the offender giving assythment. That is clear from the first known text of a remission for killing, in an early fourteenth-century formulary:
[the king] remits our rancour against T de C for the death of X, provided that he makes peace with the relatives and friends of X so that we hear no further complaint; takes him under our peace; and forbids anyone to hurt him on account of the death of X under pain of forfeiture, or to kill him under pain of death.
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An actual early fifteenth-century remission is similar but fuller:
Remission by Robert, Duke of Albany, Governor of Scotland, to Thomas Boyd of Kilmarnock, Robert Muir of Rowallan, etc., for the slaughter of Maurice Neilson of Dalrymple, Robert Black and Donald Young at Dalmellington, for burning their houses, for ravaging the goods and chattels of Alexander Cunningham at Badlane, and the lands of Drumcross, and for all other depredations. Provided that Thomas etc. make such peace and concord with the kin and friends of the late Maurice etc., and give such compensation for all damages, that henceforth no complaint shall be heard about this matter. Also, Thomas etc. are taken firmly into the Governor's peace: they are not to be attacked, under threat of royal forfeiture. 24 October 1409.
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Unfortunately Scottish remissions, unlike French, did not rehearse offenders' stories; but their principle was the same. So was the procedure, which (at least from the later fifteenth century) involved obtaining a royal letter that was either effective immediately, or was examined in court (usually under challenge), and if acceptable was then put into operation; but both processes depended on the opposing party issuing a 'letter of slains' certifying due satisfaction. 130 Historians have mostly echoed such criticism, but detailed analysis gives a more complex picture.
The first reference to remissions is in the Assise Willelmi Regis: if a thief was lawfully executed and his kin killed his accuser, 'the king shall have his full right from the killers' -'without any concord or remission unless by the advice and consent of [the victim's] kin'; and if he granted remission without their knowledge, they 'may take vengeance on those who killed their kinsman'. But only the first part (to the dash) is William I's; the rest is a late thirteenth-or early fourteenth-century amendment.
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That shows the emergence of remissions, and highlights the necessity for consent by the victim's kin and the legitimacy of vengeance killing -though perhaps only in this special case.
Formal parliamentary records begin with Robert I's legislation of 1318, which has three relevant chapters. Because of past 'disagreements and grievances … between the nobles', c.22 forbade 'that henceforth any person cause damage, burden or harm to another', and anyone doing so shall have 'broken the peace of the lord king', 133 which looks like a (highly optimistic) ban on feuding. Also, c.5 enacted that when anyone was convicted 'of homicide, rapine, theft or other offences … common justice be done
, SHR 92 (2013), 1-37, at pp. 30-3; and for slains, see Wormald, 'Bloodfeud', 62-3, 66. 131 Liber Pluscardensis, 2 vols., ed. F. J. H. Skene (Edinburgh, 1877-80), i, 399-400. This chronicle was written in the early 1460s, but survives only in copies from 1478×1496 and (apparently) 1489. The poem -the last item in the chronicle -is in only the 1489 version (ibid., i, pp. x-xii), and so may well be an addition to the text proper. Therefore it is more likely to be aimed at James III (whom the criticism fits exactly, see below, at note 145) than James II, as is usually said, e.g. without redemption', and c.11 that 'no-one [shall] take a redemption from a thief'-but neither provision applied to the king or to lords possessing 'liberties in such matters'. 134 So lords of regality could grant remissions; but who else had been doing so, wrongfully? Perhaps earls -which would have important implications -but we cannot say. However, crown authority over remissions was now asserted.
Next, after David II came back from captivity in 1357, his 'full council' declared 'that nobody in future shall move war against his neighbours' (again anti-feud), and that the king would review past remissions by his lieutenant. 135 However, royal impartiality became an issue: in 1366 'the three communities' insisted that justice should be done without favour, that judicial letters should not be revoked (as later in 'The Harp'), and that 'remissions … should be null and void' unless compensation was accepted within a year. 136 And in 1370, David had to prohibit remissions for homicides found by inquest to be by 'murder or malice aforethought' unless the general council gave approval; though he could still grant them for unpremeditated killing. 137 Theoretically, that was a significant change. For William I, 'murder and premeditated assault' pertained 'to my regality', and so, by Robert I's logic, the crown could grant remissions for them; but parliament was now attempting to restrict that regality. After Robert II succeeded David, the 1372 parliament developed the new rules, allegedly because of recent killings. Since justice 'was not as fast as expedient', in future a killer should be imprisoned while an immediate assize determined whether the homicide was 'by forethought felony or murder, or from the heat of anger, namely chaudemella'. If the former, 'justice is immediately to be done'; if the latter, 'he will have the legitimate and due delays and defences'.
138 Those who committed murder or forethought killing were now to be executed at once! The new rules were draconianbut exceptional, because they were to apply for just three years. And 1384 saw further law-and-order legislation. Unfortunately the homicide measures (again for three years) are lost; but the concept of forethought malice (precognita malicia) was extended to mutilation, wounding and beating. 139 The next recorded legislation was under Robert 134 RPS, 1318/5, 11. Note Scottish Formularies, E49 (pp. 74-5): a brieve by which the king 'following his statute issued dealing with such a case, remits his rancour' for a killing found by inquest to be in selfdefence. This, pace Duncan, can be associated with the 1318 legislation, c.5. 135 RPS, 1357/11/12-13. 136 Ibid., 1366/7/6, 13, my paraphrase of some problematic wording, which may have been mistranscribed: 'remissions should be null and void, nec satifiat parti infra annum a data earundem, nisi forte manifeste steterit per illos quorum interest'. 137 Ibid., 1370/2/36: per murthyr vel per precogitatam maliciam. See also 1370/2/12, and Scottish Formularies, E14 (pp. 55-6): a 'brieve to the sheriff to hold an inquest into whether the bearer killed someone in a rage and not by murder or forethought felony'; this probably dates from the early 1370s, and certainly from before 1424. 138 RPS, 1372/3/6, and 7-12; Sellar, 'Forethocht felony', 48-9. 139 RPS, 1384/11/1, 6-17. A whole folio is clearly missing between the preamble to c.6, and the middle of what is called c.7: see notes to c.6 and c.7. The time limit is stated in c.17, while c.9 deals with mutilation and wounding by forethought, for which the process should proceed ' as is ordained above concerning homicide'. Much of Robert II's and Robert III's parliamentary records are missing, and what survives is mostly in problematic copies: ibid., 1384/1/1, note.
III: the 1397 'statute of Stirling' addressing 'great and horrible destructions … and slaughters'. No one was to 'use destructions, slaughter, reif nor burning … under the pain of forfeiture of life and goods', and for three years offenders identified by inquest had to give securities to appear at the next justice ayre; those who could not would be executed, and those who fled would be put 'to the horn [outlawed] without remission'. 140 The following year, 'to repress transgressors more sternly', all offenders were given just forty days 'to stand to law', or be outlawed; 141 while in 1399, a further amendment put victims' complaints to royal officers on the same footing as formal inquests, and the statute was extended for three more years.
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The later fourteenth-century acts demonstrate serious concern about law and order, echoing English and French measures.
143 But they also demonstrate consistent, thoughtful efforts by the political elite to make the system more effective, including (ideally) limiting remissions to unpremeditated offences. That, however (as noted above), restricted royal power and grace, and so had to be convincingly justified: hence the preambles highlighting awful lawlessness, which (as with modern equivalents) can be regarded as political propaganda depicting a collapse of law and order which had to be rectified. 144 The most famous instance of such propaganda is, of course, Bower's story of James I being told on his return to Scotland in 1424 about the 'thieving, dishonest conduct and plundering' in Scotland, and replying, 'If God spares me I shall see to it that the key guards the castle and the thorn bushes the cow'. 145 His first enactment in 1424 was 'that firm and secure peace be … held among all and sundry lieges and subjects of our sovereign lord the king. And that no man … move or make war against another, under all pain that may follow by the course of common law'. 146 That is nothing new, and in practice his only important innovation was to make his predecessors' three-year provisions permanent. But the lives of those guilty of forethought homicide were to be 'at the king's will', so remissions were not forbidden: James had cancelled the 1370s restriction on royal grace. 147 reflects a specific problem with James III (as probably reflected in 'The Harp') -which he may have justified in terms of royal power to 'let live' through acts of mercy.
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In contrast, under James IV -who has the best law-and-order reputation of any late medieval Scottish king -the legislation has no mention of (and hence concern about) remissions until 1504, when, because of 'great slaughter … and the reasons for it in the assurance and belief of getting swift remissions', he agreed to prohibit them 'for slaughter committed as premeditated felony' until decided otherwise.
154 This parliament, however, was held in response to specific defiance from parts of the Highlands and the West, and both the preamble and the act (with its ban on mercy for deliberate killing) can be seen as political statements. That said, the act -which echoes criticisms of his father -has been seen as complaining about James using remissions to raise money. 155 These were certainly lucrative: for instance in 1495 Hugh Rose of Kilravock and William Munro of Foulis (plus accomplices) paid £233.6s.8d. and £80 respectively for remissions for killing Walter Gawane. 156 But so long as the crown ensured that remissions did bring assythment and pacification (which James III probably did not do), then to view them chiefly from a fiscal standpoint is distorting. As with early medieval wergeld or cró and modern fines, the exaction of money was primarily punitive; royal remissions for serious crimes were not cheap, while the victim's kin had to be compensated, too. More significantly, the act banned only remissions for homicide by forethought. The preamble suggests such killings were widespread, but is that correct? For James 149 Ibid., 1469/25; 1471/5/3; 1484/2/33; 1485/5/10; 1487/10/8-9; 1488/1/22. 150 Ibid., 1473/7/10. A respite was a conditional remission, limited to a number of years. 151 Ibid., 1478/6/80: discussed (and redated) in Tanner IV, the Privy Seal Register survives, and so all the registered remissions that were formally registered can be studied -though here only a brief analysis is possible. In all, 581 remissions and temporary respites were registered. The breakdown of the most serious offence mentioned in each of them is: 249 remissions or respites for homicide; ninety-seven for forethought felony; 114 for defying the crown (mostly by rebelling, helping rebels and outlaws, refusing to serve in the army, and abusing sheriffs); fiftyfour for reif or robbery (mostly of livestock); forty for arson, plunder and other 'oppression' (damage to property); five for rape; fourteen for theft; and eight for 'theftwise' damaging the goods of the victim when lying with his wife (which must have meant stealing or damaging the husband's sexual rights over his wife, thus making adultery criminal and entitling the husband to assythment). All the offences except theft and adultery usually involved violence and could be associated with feud, but here my focus is on homicide and forethought felony.
157
It should be noted, however, that 'forethought felony' per se did not automatically indicate killing: its general usage shows it was a wider concept, applicable to any premeditated violence. That is demonstrated by the remission granted to Andrew, Thomas and John Hunter in September 1498, 'for the slaughter of the late (umquhile) Thomas Blackford, and for the forethought felony done upon the said Thomas, his wife, bairns and servants': 158 clearly Thomas, his wife, children and servants had suffered a premeditated attack, but only Thomas had been killed, perhaps by accident. More generally, when a person is said to have been killed, they are invariably described as 'late', which is never found in forethought remissions unless a killing is also recorded; and whereas with remissions for homicide all other offences are normally included as well, with remissions for forethought offences that are not said to involve a killing, homicide is always specifically excluded.
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As for the 249 instances of actual homicide, remarkably few killings are said to be for forethought: only nine before the 1504 act, one in 1507 and two in 1510-11. 160 165 Any homicides not clearly caused by accident or rage should have been investigated, and those which inquests found not to be by forethought were probably recorded simply as homicide, 166 with no qualification (including many cases of self-defence, which the remissions never mention). In addition, the well-known propensity of medieval juries to favour the defendant would also help to explain why forethought verdicts were so scarce. 167 Furthermore, it was probably easy and safe to commit non-forethought homicide deliberately. Consider late medieval Scotland's two most notorious killings. When James II summoned the eighth earl of Douglas to Stirling in February 1452, did he seriously expect him to break the Douglas-Crawford-Ross bond? According to the 'Auchinleck Chronicle', when Douglas said (probably vehemently and certainly insultingly) 'he might not nor would not', James called him 'false traitor' and 'leapt suddenly to him with a knife'. James must have expected that outcome -but technically it was excusable homicide 'by suddenty', though Douglas's brother understandably called it foul slaughter. 168 Similarly, when in February 1306 Robert Bruce set out for his fateful meeting with John Comyn in the Greyfriars church, Dumfries, did he seriously believe that they would reach an amicable agreement? I think not, and suggest that he anticipated and quite probably engineered a hot-blooded quarrel in which Comyn could be killed without overt premeditation. 169 Irrespective of whether that is correct in these cases, the main point is that by creating a situation in which a hot-blooded quarrel was inevitable, an enemy could be killed without committing forethought felony. Also, when rival lords' followings encountered each other, tensions could easily escalate into lethal violence, as Romeo and Juliet illustrates, and as at Monzievaird in 1489, when a long-running quarrel flared up and led to Drummonds setting the local 162 Twenty-four is just under a tenth of the total: higher, surely, than the landed classes' share of the population, but roughly the same proportion as Gauvard found in France. 174 Also, hardly anyone received remissions for more than one killing, and there is only one instance (discussed below) of a killer being killed himself. 175 The James IV remissions and respites, in other words, give virtually no evidence of the chains of titfor-tat homicide that are usually associated with feuds. That may simply be a function of the way the documents were written; had they included the killers' narratives, the conclusion might be different. But the absence of tit-for-tat killing is also a feature (though not quite so extreme) of the French remissions. As said already, Gauvard attributed that to a crown policy of accepting that it could not prevent fatal quarrels from breaking out in all ranks of society -but that it could, through giving letters of remission to the killers so long as the victims' families were compensated, significantly reduce the likelihood of long-term feud, such as is found in Albania. 176 The evidence of the Scottish remissions in James IV's privy seal register, although a much smaller sample, indicates exactly the same conclusion -which puts Scotland beside France on Wormald's spectrum. Killing in quarrels was part of human nature, and late medieval Scotland's state machinery could not prevent it; but in normal circumstances it could stifle most potential feuds, and limit the duration of those that did break out. It did so, essentially, through the use of remissions -which could be described as harnessing the justice of the feud to serve the justice of the state. is too narrow a definition: in Anglo-Saxon England 'it referred ... to particularly dishonourable killings, perhaps involving secrecy in some form or even an attempt to hide the victim's body' (Lambert, 'Theft, homicide and crime'); and OED, s.v. 'murder': 'In old English the word could be applied to any homicide that was strongly reprobated ... more strictly, however, it denoted secret murder'. It is best, therefore, to regard it as an outrageous, essentially unpardonable crime -of which secret killing was the typical example. de Beaumanoir's later thirteenth-century Coutumes state that 'murder is when anyone kills anyone else or has them killed by premeditation between sunset and sunrise, or under truce or assurance'. All three contrast murder and homicide; but with Regiam and 'Glanvill' the distinction is obviously between secret and open killing; while for Beaumanoir homicide is simply killing in hot blood (chaude mellee), which blurs the issue. 182 But by Beaumanoir's time, 'premeditated malice' and 'wrath' were being distinguished in England, too, and in the fourteenth century premeditation eventually came into a statute of 1390 forbidding pardons 'for murder [and] homicide occasioned by … malice aforethought'. 183 Similarly but earlier, a French ordinance of 1356 banned royal remissions for 'murders and mutilations made by premeditation and evil will'.
III

184
These straddle the Scottish acts of 1370 and 1372, which also restricted remissions, and made a distinction between murder and forethought felony on the one hand and (echoing Beaumanoir) chaudmella or hot-blooded killing on the other. 185 Legal minds in all three countries were working in the same direction.
In fifteenth-century France and England, however, murder became more general, encompassing premeditated killing just as nowadays. 186 Scottish fifteenthcentury legislation shows a similar blurring, but in the opposite direction: from James I on, the acts mention only 'forethought felony' and 'sudden chaudmella', dropping murder. That might support Sellar's argument about murder being incorporated within forethought felony in the 1370s -and it could be regarded as a sub-category of the latter in Patrick McCulloch's respite. On the other hand, as we have seen, forethought felony covered more than killing, while murder was still distinct from slaughter because it was committed at night. Moreover, the Border ayres studied by Armstrong had a case of 'forethought felony by means of murder' and another of 'murder [and] killing' -'both suggestive of secret killing, one with premeditation, the other without'. 187 Thus I would argue that in Scotland the concept of murder retained its special restricted meaning at least until the end of the fifteenth century -and perhaps beyond, given the definition in Skene's De Verborum Significatione of 1597:
MURTHURUM, whereof of some is called private, that is manslaughter, whereof the author is unknown, whereof the inquisition belongs to the crowner; as where a person is found slain, or drowned, in any place or water. Other is
